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“INDIANS, IN A JURISDICTIONAL SENSE”: TRIBAL CITIZENSHIP AND
OTHER FORMS OF NON-INDIAN CONSENT TO TRIBAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
Paul Spruhan ∗

In 1844, an exasperated Agency Superintendent reported to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs details of a troubling case. William Armstrong described the hanging of
Jacob West, a white man of no Indian ancestry, at the order of a Cherokee court for
participating in the murder of a Cherokee. 1 West had been married to a Cherokee and
had lived in the Cherokee Nation. 2 Under Cherokee law in effect at the time, he qualified
to be a naturalized citizen of the Nation. 3 West unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas
corpus from the federal district court in Arkansas to release him from Cherokee
custody. 4 According to Armstrong, the court denied West’s request because West had
married into the Cherokee Nation and “had, for all legal purposes, become one of the
tribe.” 5 Based on West’s execution at the order of the tribal court, Armstrong asked,
are all other tribes to exercise the same jurisdiction? Are the Osage to be
suffered to scalp any white man married among them, whenever,
according to their peculiar customs, he may have incurred that penalty? . .
. If an American, by marriage and residence among the Cherokees
becomes for all legal purposes an Indian, it is difficult to conceive why the
same consequences should not result from marrying and residing among
any other tribe. 6
Fast forward to 2011. The Court of Appeals of the Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe
faced a similar question, though under somewhat different facts: could a non-Indian be
subject to the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction by simply signing a form indicating his
consent? 7 In Port Gamble S’Klallam v. Hjert, the non-Indian defendant consented to
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1
th
nd
Sen. Doc. No. 1, 28 Congress, 2 Session 461 (1844-45). Armstrong’s correspondence is also
discussed in Bethany Berger, “Power over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in
United States v. Rogers, 45 W M. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1998-99 (2004).
2
Sen. Doc. No. 1, supra, note 1, at 461.
3
See An Act to Legalize Intermarriage with White Men, September 28, 1839, reprinted in The
Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation 1839-51, at 32-33 (N.D.).
4
Sen. Doc. No. 1, supra, note 1, at 461.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 461-62.
7
See Port Gamble S’Klallam v. Hjert, No. POR-CR-09/09-169 (slip op. December 15, 2011).
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prosecution by the tribal court for alcohol offenses by signing such a form. 8 Hjert had
previously pled guilty before the tribal court to similar offenses and been sentenced to
detention, fines, and probation. 9 The form, apparently prepared by the tribal prosecutor,
explicitly limited the scope of consent to prosecution in that case, and not a general
consent to tribal authority 10 Despite his consent, and his apparent failure to seek
dismissal of the prosecution, the tribal trial court dismissed the case on its own, ruling
that the tribe had no jurisdiction. 11 The tribal Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal,
holding that though non-Indians generally might be able to consent to tribal jurisdiction,
the absence of an affirmative tribal statute authorizing such consent meant that the tribe
currently lacked such jurisdiction. 12 Further, the court ruled that the consent itself did not
comport with the due process requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act in the absence
of evidence that it was “freely and expressly given, voluntary, intelligent and case
specific.” 13
These different outcomes reflect not only differences in the two tribal nations’
laws at the time of the cases but also significant changes in the federal view of and
influence on tribal criminal jurisdiction. Between 1844 and 2011 federal courts would
claim to reduce tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the point that standard
descriptions of federal Indian law state that tribes lack any such jurisdiction, or, at least
that such authority is restricted solely to contempt and exclusion from tribal lands. 14
Indeed, a mere two years after Armstrong’s report on West’s execution, the United
States Supreme Court decided United States v. Rogers, ruling that the United States
had jurisdiction to prosecute a white man married into the Cherokee Nation. 15 In
Rogers, the Supreme Court concluded that a white man could not claim to be an
“Indian” exempt from federal jurisdiction based on his status as a citizen of the Nation.16
According to the Court, Indian status was racial under federal criminal law, barring white
men from being “Indians.” 17 Though, as discussed below, the ruling did not forbid tribal
jurisdiction over the same offense or the naturalization of non-Indians as tribal citizens,
it nonetheless interfered with tribes’ citizenship determinations by stripping exclusive
tribal jurisdiction. More significantly, the United States Supreme Court some one
hundred and thirty five years after Rogers ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish that tribes
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians at all. 18 Though this ruling did not explicitly

8

Hjert., slip op. at 1-2.
Id. at 1.
10
Id. at 2.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 15.
13
Id. at 16.
14
See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.04 (2005 Nell Newton, ed.); STEPHEN
th
PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 140-41 (4 ed. 2012).
15
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846). For a detailed discussion of the background of
the case, see Berger, supra, note 1; DAVID W ILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 38-49 (1997).
16
See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73.
17
Id. at 573.
18
Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
9
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prohibit consent, the sweeping nature of the ruling created more doubt on its viability. 19
The Cherokee Nation’s decision to execute West was not made with any consideration
of federal views expressed in Oliphant, while such views greatly affected the S’Klallam’s
decision to dismiss Hjert’s prosecution, as the Court of Appeals discussed in detail in its
opinion. 20
In the face of these developments that purport to restrict if not outright bar
consent, the question still remains: Can tribes exert criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians who consent, by whatever means, to adhere to tribal laws? Has federal Indian
law, and tribes’ reaction to it, changed the universe of tribal jurisdiction so significantly
that non-Indians can truly never be subject to tribal criminal law? This article explores
the concept of consent as a still viable theory of tribal criminal jurisdiction. I first examine
some historical examples of non-Indian consent through adoption or naturalization
under tribal law, and reactions to such consent by federal officials. I then discuss
modern examples of tribal law theories of consent, primarily through recent statutory law
and opinions of the Navajo Nation. Finally, I suggest different forms of consent tribes
might consider, and their relative potential success in surviving federal scrutiny.
Ultimately, I conclude that the grant of tribal citizenship to non-Indians has the greatest
likelihood of establishing consent. However, I also conclude that non-Indians should
consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction to foster true tribal sovereignty.
At the outset, it is important to define clearly what I mean by “consent.” I am not
defining it to mean mere physical presence on tribal lands, as the United States
Supreme Court in Oliphant and Duro v. Reina, discussed below, has clearly rejected
that theory of consent. 21 What I mean by “consent” is a voluntary acceptance, whether
explicit or implicit, by a non-Indian of tribal criminal jurisdiction. This voluntary
acceptance may be through the grant of citizenship by a tribe; marriage or other familial
affiliation with a tribal member; or written acknowledgment of tribal authority generally or
in a specific case, whether as a stated condition of living or working on tribal lands or
not. In reality, on the ground in Indian Country, non-Indians quietly but routinely consent
through compliance with tribal police on roads or in their homes on the reservation,
through waivers of their federally-recognized right to file a writ of habeas corpus, or
other jurisdictional challenge to tribal authority. 22 These consents are done with little
19

See Hjert, slip. op. at 9-10 (discussing whether Oliphant means that tribes lack subject matter or
personal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and therefore whether non-Indians can ever consent); Christoper
Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions During the Last Quarter of the
Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. L., 186 (2000) (discussing concern that
Oliphant precludes jurisdiction based on general rule that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created by
consent).
20
See Hjert, slip op. at 4-13 (discussing federal limitations on tribal jurisdiction).
21
Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. at 212 (stating flatly that “Indian tribes do not have inherent authority
to try and punish non-Indians.”); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990) (rejecting argument that
defendant’s contacts with tribe justified tribal jurisdiction as merely a different articulation of argument that
physical presence is enough to establish criminal jurisdiction). For further discussion of the federal theory
of consent in Duro, see infra, notes 123-26.
22
Indeed, on some Indian reservations, tribal police are the only, or, at least, closest first responders to
incidents involving non-Indians when 911 or other requests for assistance are made to law enforcement.
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fanfare, and evade documentation through tribal or federal court decisions. 23 What I am
interested in here, however, are attempts under affirmative tribal law to establish
consent as a means of tribal authority. How have tribes conceptualized consent, and
how might they in the future, whether with federal review in mind or not? To answer this
question, it is important to first consider how tribes have historically dealt with
jurisdiction over non-Indians through consent.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TRIBAL LAWS OF CONSENT THROUGH ADOPTION OR
NATURALIZATION
One simple way non-Indians historically consented to tribal authority was through
adoption or naturalization as citizens of the tribal nation. Accounts of tribal societies
include numerous references to non-Indians living among Indians, whether by marrying
into the tribe or simply settling among them. 24 Accounts of so-called “white Indians”
described persons taken captive by tribes during times of conflict, who elected to remain
with the tribe even after attempts to ransom or return them to white society. 25 Some
tribes engaged in elaborate adoption ceremonies for non-Indians and through such
ceremonies some captives replaced family members killed in wars. 26 Some of these
non-Indians who married into tribal society lived their whole lives in it, and produced
“mixed-blood” children. 27 Other tribes, even into the late nineteenth century, adopted
whites married into the tribe or otherwise residing among them, through approval by

23

The U.S. Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina believed this acquiescence to tribal jurisdiction may be why
there were, in its view, few federal challenges to tribal court jurisdiction. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. at
689.
24
See, e.g., Letter of Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur to Acting Secretary of War George Graham,
September 30, 1817, reprinted in 2 American State Papers, Indian Affairs 138, 139 (1834) (discussing
non-Indians living among Wyandot who “have identified themselves in feelings, manners, and interest
with the Indians.”); Letter of Thomas McKenney to Secretary of War James Barbour, September 2, 1825
reprinted in 2 American State Papers, at 651 (listing one hundred and forty seven white men and seventy
three white women married into Cherokee Nation); Jedidiah Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on
Indian Affairs, Appendix 37 (1822) (discussing white and black men married into Fond Du Lac tribe);
James Axtell, The White Indians of Colonial America, 32 W ILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY 55, 56 (1975)
(reporting that “large numbers of Englishmen had chosen to become Indians- by running away from
colonial society and joining Indian society, by not trying to escape after being captured, or by electing to
remain with their Indian captors when treaties of peace periodically afforded them the opportunity to
return home.”).
25
Letter of Lewis Cass, supra, note 24, at 139 (“Some have been taken prisoners in early life [and] have
married Indian women[.]”); Axtell, supra, note 22, at 56-58; see generally, JOHN DEMOS, THE UNREDEEMED
CAPITIVE (1994) (recounting story of Eunice Williams, daughter of a New England preacher taken captive
by Kahnawake Mohawks who refused to return to English society).
26
See Axtell, supra, note 24 at 59, 67, 69-73; Demos, supra, note 25, at 81-82, 137, 163 (describing
adoption of captives and assignment of captives to Mohawk clans).
27
See, e.g., Demos, supra, note 25, at 142, 186 (discussing white men and women captured at a young
age who married and had children with Iroquois Indians); see generally S.C. GWYNNE, EMPIRE OF THE
SUMMER MOON (2011) (discussing Cynthia Parker, a white woman captured by the Comanche at age nine
who refused to leave the Comanche until forcibly returned, and her mixed-blood son, Quanah Parker,
who waged war against white settlers).
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tribal councils. 28 Some tribes allowed them to vote or participate in negotiations on
important tribal matters, including agreements to cede tribal lands. 29
Three of the five so-called “Civilized Tribes” had formal citizenship laws that
authorized whites married to tribal citizens to become citizens of the Nation. Similar in
content, each tribe’s law recognized the ability of whites to be naturalized or adopted.
An early Cherokee statute passed in 1819, before removal of the Nation to the Indian
Territory, required white men to get a license from the national clerk and to marry a
Cherokee woman through a minister or “other authorized person” before they could be
recognized as citizens of the Nation. 30 In 1836, the Choctaw Nation similarly recognized
the right of naturalization for a white man married to a Choctaw woman, and, like the
Cherokee Nation, stated that if the white man parted from his wife “without just
provocation,” he would forfeit his citizenship. 31 Both later required such white men to
swear allegiance to the tribe and to abide by its laws. 32 Later statutes passed by both
tribal nations, as well as the Chickasaw Nation, required certification by a certain
number of citizens vouching for the white man’s character before naturalization could
occur. 33 In its 1855 constitution, the Chickasaw Nation recognized the authority of the
legislature to adopt anyone except “a negro, or descendant of a negro,” though such
adoption only granted the right “to settle and remain in the nation, and to be subject to
its laws.” 34 It further made intermarried men and women eligible for annuities as
citizens, though they were barred from “any office of trust or profit in [the] Nation.” 35
The Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw and Seminole Nations recognized the right of
blacks to citizenship under certain circumstances. Though intermarriage with blacks had
been prohibited under Cherokee law in 1839, 36 the Cherokee Nation in 1866 amended
28

See, e.g., Letter of Commissioner D.W. Browning to the Secretary of the Interior, June 7, 1895,
reprinted in Transcript of Record, United States ex. rel. West v. Hitchcock, No. 194, 27, 31 (discussing
Wichita tribal council decision to approve adoption of white men and white women as citizens); Letter of
D.W. Browning to Jane Shirley, April 3, 1894, reprinted in Transcript of Record, supra, at 44-45
(discussing adoption of white man by Comanche, Wichita, and Caddo tribes); Letter of Acting Secretary
M.L. Joslyn to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 13, 1884, reprinted in Transcript of Record,
supra, at 39-40 (discussing adoption of whites by Quapaw tribe).
29
See, e.g., 2 American State Papers, supra, note 24, at 239 (1820 report of treaty commissioners of
appointment of principal chiefs and “six white men and half-breeds” to Choctaw negotiation committee);
nd
st
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 14, 52 Cong., 1 Sess. 14-15 (1892) (listing at least one white man as “male adult
member” of Wichita tribe empowered to vote on agreement).
30
Act of November 2, 1819, reprinted in 2 American States Papers, supra, note 24, at 283.
31
Act of October 8, 1836, reprinted in The Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation (1840).
32
Act of November 10, 1843, Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation 1839-1841, 92 (N.D.); Act of
October 30, 1888, Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation (1894).
33
Act of October 19, 1876, §1, reprinted in Laws of the Chickasaw Nation, I.T. relating to Intermarried and
Adopted Citizens and the Rights of Freedmen 26 (N.D.).
34
General Provisions, § 11, Constitution of 1856, reprinted in Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the
Chickasaws (1860) (emphasis added).
35
Constitution of the Chickasaw Nation, 1855, General Provisions, Section 9, reprinted in Constitution,
Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, supra, note 34.
36
Act of September 19, 1839, reprinted in Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation, supra, note 32,
at 19.
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its constitution to recognize the right of former slaves and free blacks living within the
Nation at the beginning of the Civil War, and their descendants, to citizenship in the
Nation. 37 Such amendment appears to be based on the Cherokee’s agreement in its
1866 treaty with the United States to recognize such “Freedmen” as entitled to “all the
rights of native Cherokees.” 38 The Seminoles similarly agreed in their 1866 treaty that
certain “persons of African descent and blood,” and their descendants, as well as “such
other of the same race” were allowed to live in the Nation and “enjoy all the rights of
native citizens.” 39 The Creeks similarly agreed to recognize blacks under an almost
identical provision in their treaty. 40 The treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaws placed
$300,000 paid by the United States for land cessions in trust until the tribes passed laws
to accept the Freedmen and their descendants as citizens. 41 The Choctaws accepted
them through legislation passed in 1883. 42
Importantly, those Nations reserved criminal authority over such naturalized
citizens in their treaties with the United States. In the 1835 Treaty of New Echota, the
Cherokees reserved to themselves the power to pass laws for the protection of “persons
and property within their own country belonging to their people or such persons as have
connected themselves with them.” 43 In the Cherokee Nation’s 1866 treaty, the Nation
reserved “exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising within their country
in which members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties, or
where the cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee Nation[.]“44 As Freedmen were
granted citizenship in the same treaty, such jurisdiction appears to have extended to
them as well as intermarried whites. 45 The Nation reiterated this authority in an 1891
agreement with the United States. 46 In their collective 1866 treaty, the Choctaws and
Chickasaws similarly reserved such right over intermarried white persons residing on
tribal lands or who had been adopted by legislative action, stating that such a white
person was

37

Constitution of the Cherokee Nation, amended Article III, Section 5, November 26, 1866, reprinted in
Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation (1875).
38
Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866, Art. 9. In a recent opinion, the Cherokee Supreme
Court concluded that the treaty provision did not grant citizenship, but only promised that the Freedmen
“would be treated as equals to the citizens of the Cherokee Nation under the federal law as it existed at
the time.” Cherokee Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, slip op. at 8 (August 22, 2011).
39
Treaty with the Seminoles, March 21,1866, Art. 2.
40
Treaty with the Creeks, June 14, 1866, Art. 2.
41
Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, April 28, 1866, Art. 3.
42
See Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 614 (1896) (discussing legislation).
43
Treaty with the Cherokees, December 29, 1835, Art. 5 (emphasis added).
44
Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, supra, note 38, Art. 13.
45
The United States Supreme Court concluded as much in Alberty v. United States, which concerned the
prosecution of a Cherokee Freedmen for the murder of an illegitimate child of a black female slave and a
Choctaw man. See 162 U.S. 499, 500-01 (1896). The wife of the victim was a black “freed woman” made
a citizen of the Cherokee Nation by the Treaty of 1866. Id. at 501. Though the Court believed Alberty, the
defendant, was a citizen of the Cherokee Nation and under its jurisdiction if the victim were also a citizen,
it concluded Cherokee law precluded the victim from being a citizen, as marriage to a freedman did not
confer citizenship on the spouse. See Id. at 499, 501.
46
Agreement with the Cherokee Nation, December 19, 1891, Art. 2.
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deemed to be a member of said nation, and . . . subject to the laws of the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations according to his domicile, and to
prosecution and trial before their tribunals, and to punishment according to
their laws in all respects as though he was a native Choctaw or
Chickasaw. 47

The Seminoles similarly stated in their treaty that “the laws of said nation shall be
equally binding upon all persons of whatever race or color, who may be adopted as
citizens or members of said tribe.”48 The Creeks included an almost identical provision
in their treaty, with the addition that all citizens were also entitled to equal protection
under their law. 49 Through these treaty provisions, tribal nations asserted their right to
exert jurisdiction over non-Indians who became tribal citizens.
HISTORICAL FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF NON-INDIAN TRIBAL CITIZENS
How did federal courts and federal officials react to such assertions of the right to
confer citizenship and prosecute based upon such citizenship? Read in isolation, the
holding of U.S. v. Rogers, that a white man married into a tribe could not be an “Indian”
under federal criminal law, might be seen as the beginning of the complete racialization
of Indian status, or at least the federal repudiation of non-Indian tribal citizenship.
However, the Court made that ruling only in the context of the definition of “Indian” for
federal criminal jurisdiction. The Court explicitly disclaimed any conclusion on whether a
white man could nonetheless consent to tribal jurisdiction, stating that “he may by such
adoption become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and make himself amenable
to their laws and usages.” 50 While as a practical matter, extension of federal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by naturalized tribal citizens might have divested a tribal nation’s
prosecutorial authority, as the person might have been in federal custody before the
tribe could assert its jurisdiction, Rogers did not divest such jurisdiction as a matter of
law. 51
Importantly, for the tribal nations with a treaty-recognized right to exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over adopted or naturalized citizens, Rogers became a legal nullity.
The 1866 treaty with the Cherokee Nation authorized federal jurisdiction over crimes
between two naturalized Cherokee citizens, and therefore effectively overturned
Rogers. The Choctaw and Chickasaw treaty’s recognition of authority was even
47

Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, supra, note 41, Art. 38.
Treaty with the Seminoles, supra, note 37, Art. 2.
49
Treaty with the Creeks, supra, note 38, Art. 2.
50
See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
51
Indeed, Rogers himself was put into federal custody by Cherokee law enforcement, as there were no
Cherokee jails to keep him, on the expectation he would then be returned for prosecution by the
Cherokee Nation. See Berger, supra, note 1, at 1984. Instead, federal officials kept him, transferred him
to Little Rock, Arkansas, and initiated federal prosecution. Id. at 1985-88. In a curious twist, Rogers
himself died while escaping from federal custody before his case even reached the Supreme Court. See
Id. at 1999. The Court was then answering a theoretical question that would have had no practical effect
on Rogers himself. See Id. at 1999-2003.
48
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broader, as it reserved criminal jurisdiction to those nations seemingly regardless of the
status of the victim.
Federal courts grappled with these treaty exceptions to Rogers, but ultimately
upheld the tribes’ exclusive criminal jurisdiction. For example, “Hanging judge” Parker of
the Circuit Court of Western Arkansas found ways around the treaty requirements in
several cases. 52 In Ex Parte Kenyon (1878), ironically the main case cited by the U.S.
Supreme Court to bolster its decision in Oliphant, 53 Judge Parker ruled the Cherokee
Nation lacked jurisdiction over a white man who had been naturalized through
marriage. 54 Kenyon, the white man, had stolen a horse, the horse of his deceased
Cherokee wife in fact, and had been sentenced by the Nation to five years detention. 55
Parker granted a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Nation generally lacked
jurisdiction over a non-Indian. 56 Though Judge Parker acknowledged Kenyon was a
citizen of the Nation under its exclusive jurisdiction granted by the treaty, Judge Parker
reasoned that Kenyon’s Cherokee citizenship lapsed under Cherokee law when he left
the Nation with the horse and his children. 57 In another case, Judge Parker evaded the
Choctaw treaty by questioning the status of Choctaw wives in Ex Parte Reynolds
(1879). This case concerned a murder of one white citizen by another. 58 Judge Parker
focused on paternal descent to find one of the wives was not truly Choctaw. Therefore,
the case was not within the exclusive Choctaw jurisdiction under the treaty, because
this finding meant one of the white men in the controversy was not actually a Choctaw
citizen. 59
Though Judge Parker’s decisions found ways around exclusive tribal jurisdiction,
the United States Supreme Court later affirmed the tribes’ exclusive authority over such
cases in several opinions. In Nofire v. United States (1897), the United States attempted
to prosecute several Cherokees for the murder of a naturalized white Cherokee
citizen. 60 The circuit court had concluded that the evidence of the victim’s compliance
with the requirements of Cherokee marriage laws, and therefore evidence of his
citizenship, was insufficient. 61 The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the victim
had married a Cherokee woman in a manner consistent with the Cherokees’
requirements for white intermarriage discussed above, and by doing so the victim was
52

The moniker “hanging judge” was quite appropriate, as between 1875 and 1896 his court hanged
seventy-nine people, including many Indians. Berger, supra, note 1, at 1998. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
in Oliphant includes a lengthy digression in a footnote discussing Judge Parker and his knowledge of
Indians in a notably positive light. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200 n. 10.
53
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 199-200.
54
14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (1878) (No. 7,720).
55
Id. at 353.
56
Id. at 355.
57
Id.
58
20 F. Cas. 582, 582-83 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 11,719).
59
Id. at 585. For a discussion of that case and its influence over the conception of Indian status in the late
nineteenth century, see Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2006).
60
See 164 U.S. 657, 658 (1897).
61
Id.
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“to a certain extent allying himself with the Cherokee Nation.” 62 The Court similarly held
in Ex Parte Mayfield (1891) that a Cherokee citizen, whether a citizen by birth or
adoption, could not be convicted of adultery in federal court because of the Cherokees’
exclusive jurisdiction. 63 The Supreme Court suggested crimes between Freedmen were
also within the Cherokee Nation’s exclusive jurisdiction in Alberty v. United States
(1896). 64 The Court ultimately upheld federal jurisdiction over the Freedman defendant
because the victim was the illegitimate son of a Choctaw man and a black slave, and
according to the Court not an “Indian,” and the victim’s marriage to an adopted black
woman did not grant him citizenship under Cherokee law. 65 Further, in Lucas v. United
States, the Court, following Alberty, concluded that the murder of a black Freedman in
the Choctaw Nation by a Choctaw Indian would be under exclusive tribal jurisdiction. 66
According to the Court, the prosecution implied to the trial court that “there were
negroes who were, and those who were not, Indians, in a jurisdictional sense.”67 The
Court reversed the trial court on the issue of how the black victim’s citizenship in the
Choctaw Nation was to be proven, rejecting the lower court’s presumption that a “negro”
in the Nation was not a tribal citizen. 68
Not only did the federal courts weigh in on tribal citizenship, but federal officials
also recognized adopted or naturalized white men as “Indians” when they abided by
requirements of tribal approval of land cessions. Indeed, in the late nineteenth century,
during the dismantling of tribal lands through allotment, negotiators for the United States
openly sought out and recorded the signatures of intermarried men as fully empowered
to act along with other tribal citizens in certain situations. For example, the agreement
with the Sioux Nation to break up the Great Sioux Reservation in 1889 was signed by
some ninety-four white men, who were described as “white man” or “squaw man” 69
openly in the federal commissioners’ report to Congress. 70 They were nonetheless
listed as adult male members of the Nation empowered to approve the agreement. 71
Justification for such treatment appears to have been based on a reference in the 1868
Treaty of Fort Laramie to persons “legally incorporated,” with the tribe, a provision which
also appears in several treaties negotiated with the Navajo Nation and other tribes in
the same year. 72 The United States Supreme Court observed in Red Bird v. United
62

Id. at 662.
See 141 U.S. 107, 114 (1891).
64
162 U.S. 499, 501-02.
65
See Id. at 501, 504-05.
66
163 U.S. 612, 614-15 (1896).
67
Id. at 615.
68
See Id. at 616.
69
“Squaw man” was a term used in the nineteenth century to describe a non-Indian married to an Indian
woman. www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/squaw man (accessed April 5, 2012). While used
pejoratively in some circumstances, it was also used sometimes, as here, as a neutral description. See
Spruhan, supra, note 58, at 21.
70
st
st
See, e.g., Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 51, 51 Cong., 1 Sess. 253, 259, 275-77, 279, 289-92.
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See Id.
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See Id. at 253 (identifying signatory as “White; incorporated into tribe in 1868”), 275-77, 279 (identifying
several signatories as “squaw man since 1868”); Treaty with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, Art. 6. See also
Treaty with the Navajo, June 1, 1868, Art. 5; Treaty with the Crow, May 7, 1868, Art. 6. Historian Harry
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States, a case challenging the right of certain white men to Cherokee allotments, that
the agreement to allot the Cherokee Nation would not have been approved without the
participation of white naturalized citizens. 73 Also, an agreement with the Wichita
included the signature of at least one intermarried white man, W.C. West, as an Indian
empowered to sign, and authorized allotments to citizens of the tribe “native and
adopted.” 74
Congress also recognized naturalized or adopted citizens of the Civilized Tribes
as subject to the jurisdiction of their respective tribal nation, and as eligible for tribal
property. Though Congress generally barred white men who married Indian women
after August 9, 1888 from claiming an interest in tribal property, it nonetheless
exempted such men who were “otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians.”75 In an
1890 act to organize the territory of Oklahoma, Congress recognized that “the judicial
tribunals of the Indian nations shall retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal
cases arising in the country in which members of the Nation, by nativity or adoption,
shall be the only parties.” 76 Under the instructions of the Dawes Commission, a quasijudicial tribunal created by Congress, whites and Freedmen who established their right
to citizenship to the satisfaction of the Commission were allotted land from the collective
property of their adopted tribe. 77 Further, when Congress decided to release whites and
Freedmen from restrictions on their allotments earlier than other tribal citizens, it used
the curious phrase “Indians who are not of Indian blood” to describe such citizens in the
title of the legislation. 78 However, Congress did preclude other non-Indians from
claiming allotments through judicial action, by granting a cause of action against the
United States to establish eligibility only to “persons who are in whole or in part of Indian
blood.” 79

Anderson has referred to white men recognized under the Treaty of Fort Laramie as “68-ers.” SOUTH
DAKOTA HISTORY: THE WALDRON-BLACK TOMAHAWK CONTROVERSY AND THE STATE OF MIXED-BLOODS AMONG
THE TETON SIOUX 30, 34 (2007).
73
See 203 U.S. 76, 93 (1906). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that white men married to
Cherokees after 1875 were ineligible for allotments based on Cherokee law. Id. at 79, 95 (affirming ruling
of Court of Claims).
74
nd
nd
See Senate Ex. Doc. 14, 52 Cong., 2 Sess., at 12, 14-15 (1892). For a further discussion of W.C.
West and his unsuccessful suit against the secretary of the interior to compel the grant of an allotment,
see infra, text accompanying notes 80-92929279-91.
75
25 U.S.C. § 181. Curiously, this provision is still in the current United States Code.
76
Act of May 2, 1890, § 30, 26 Stat. 81 (emphasis added). This provision supported the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions that the tribal nations had exclusive jurisdiction over crimes between tribal citizens,
whether Indians by blood, naturalized or adopted. See, e.g., Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 502
(1896) (discussing statute).
77
See H.R. Rep. 60-1454, at 2-4 (1908) (listing numbers of Indians by blood, intermarried whites, and
freedmen granted allotments among the Five Civilized Tribes). The U.S. Supreme Court did deny some
white claimants allotments in the Cherokee Nation by upholding restrictions on their citizenship under
Cherokee law. See Red Bird, 203 U.S. at 95.
78
See Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 204.
79
See 25 U.S.C. § 345. See also Drapeau v. United States, 195 F. 130, 136 (C.C.D.S.D. 1912) (holding
no jurisdiction over suit by white man claiming allotment as tribal citizen of Sioux Nation).
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Though Congress recognized non-Indian citizenship in certain situations, the
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, which arose out of
the 1891 agreement with the Wichita discussed above, suggests that the federal
government can intrude on tribal decisions to adopt or naturalize non-Indians as tribal
citizens. 80 The Department of the Interior denied W.C. West, an intermarried white man
and signatory to the agreement, an allotment, despite his claim that Wichita leaders
adopted him as a tribal citizen. 81 West filed a writ of mandamus against Secretary of the
Interior Ethan Hitchcock, alleging that his adoption by the Wichita council required the
secretary to issue him an allotment. 82 Secretary Hitchcock responded by arguing,
among other things, that he had the sole “power and authority to place an effective veto
upon [West’s] adoption by the Wichita Indian Tribe.”83 Interestingly, the record in the
case included correspondence showing that the Office of Indian Affairs had rejected
such adoptions in other situations under a general departmental policy to disapprove
such adoptions except for “exceptionally good reasons,” 84 including a request of the
Comanche Nation to adopt Mexican captives. 85 In his brief, West pointed out the ironic
position Interior was taking given his approved signature as an Indian on the agreement
ceding tribal lands to the United States 86:
[s]o long as his services in negotiating the agreement were necessary and
his influence with the other Indians was desirable, his title to tribal
membership was clear enough and strong enough to satisfy the most
jealous guardian of tribal rights to be found in the Indian Office. Only when
the need for him was past and when he demanded his part of the
consideration for the grant of these lands was it discovered by the Interior
Department that it was the function of the Secretary and not of the tribe in
council to determine who was and who was not of its membership. 87
Unmoved, the Supreme Court sided with the Department of the Interior. The
Court, through an opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that
mandamus was inappropriate because the secretary indeed had the discretionary right
to accept or deny whites as tribal citizens, regardless of the actions of tribal leaders
under tribal law. 88 The Court did not clearly identify the source of this right, but cited
“long-established” Department of the Interior practice and a broad statutory provision
80

205 U.S. 80 (1907).
Id. at 83.
82
Id. at 82-83.
83
United States ex Rel. West v. Hitchcock, No. 194, Records and Briefs of the United States Supreme
Court, Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error 32.
84
Letter of Secretary of Interior C.L. Bliss to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 7, 1898, reprinted
in Transcript of Record, supra, note 28, at 39.
85
See Letter of Acting Commissioner A.C. Tonner to Mr. Davidson and Riddle, September 30, 1901,
reprinted in Transcript of Record, supra, note 28, at 46.
86
See supra, text accompanying note 74.
87
United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, No. 194, supra, note 84, Brief for Plaintiff in Error 17 (emphasis
added).
88
Hitchcock, 205 U.S. at 84.
81

89

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume I, Issue I – Fall 2012

generally empowering the secretary in Indian affairs. 89 However the Court also stated
later in the opinion that “someone must decide who the members are.” 90 The Court did
state, in response to West’s argument that the tribal nation should decide, that
secretarial approval was indeed a good thing for the “rather helpless” Indians, as “the
temptation to white men to go through an Indian marriage for the purpose of getting
Indian rights is sufficiently plain.” 91 Though decided in the context of the right to tribal
property, the case suggests that the Department of the Interior generally has the
authority to deny tribal adoptions and decline to recognize non-Indians’ consent through
tribal citizenship.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs later asserted the same power to deny tribal
adoption or naturalization through its power to approve tribal constitutions under the
Indian Reorganization Act. In a general letter to BIA employees and tribal leaders in
1934, John Collier, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, at least entertained the
possibility that a non-Indian married into a tribe might be accepted as a tribal citizen. 92
However, in Circular 3123, issued in 1935, Collier stated that the Bureau should only
approve adoption provisions in proposed constitutions if
[t]he provisions for the adoption of non-members . . . require approval by
the Secretary of the Interior for each applicant, unless such individual
must be a person of Indian descent related by marriage or descent to the
members of the tribe. 93
Collier therefore sought to continue the Department of the Interior’s oversight of nonIndian adoptions asserted and upheld in West by requiring each one to be approved by
the Secretary of the Interior. The Indian Reorganization Act itself defined “Indian” as,
along with those of one-half Indian blood and descendants of Indians living on
reservations, “all persons who are of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction.”94 Non-Indian tribal citizens, if any
still existed at the time, therefore were excluded from the act under the three categories
in the definition.
IRA-era tribal constitutions generally followed this formulation of tribal citizenship.
Many contain general provisions acknowledging the possibility of adoption, and some
89

Id.
Id. at 85, 86.
91
Id. at 85.
92
See Letter of John Collier to Superintendents, Tribal Councils and Individual Indians, January 20, 1934,
at 6 (posing the question whether “all the residents of the reservation who are of Indian descent, or
married to an Indian, be admitted to citizenship or membership in the proposed community, or shall
restrictions, depending on degree of blood or length of residence on the reservation, be provided?”
(emphasis added)).
93
Circular 3123, Office of Indian Affairs (November 18, 1935), reprinted as Exhibit 1, Index 36, 2
Appendices to the Final Report, Task Force No. 9, Law Consolidation, Revision, and Codification,
American Indian Policy Review Commission (1977).
94
Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, § 19.
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contain a requirement for secretarial approval of such adoptions. 95 However, whether at
the choice of the tribal nation, or at the insistence of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, explicit
naturalization or recognition of non-Indian tribal citizens essentially disappeared.
One anecdotal example of discussions between a tribal nation and the federal
government on the issue involved two Pima-Maricopa tribal communities in Arizona.
According to Felix Cohen, then an attorney working with Collier, the Pima-Maricopa
communities at Gila River and Salt River had proposed a joint constitution that would
have recognized “Caucasians” previously married into the community as members. 96
According to Cohen, the same constitution would have barred future “[m]ixed marriages
of any kind” on pain of a forfeit of membership by the member engaging in the
marriage. 97 Cohen used this proposal in a memorandum on the drafting of tribal
constitutions as an example of a constitution that “considers the complications arising
out of intermarriage.” 98 However, the final constitutions, approved by the Office of Indian
Affairs in 1936, contained no such recognition of non-Indian spouses, but neither did
they bar future mixed marriages. 99 Instead, they simply barred adoptions completely. 100
CURRENT STATUS OF NON-INDIAN CONSENT
Fast forward to 2012. You would be hard pressed to find examples of consent
through citizenship, adoption, or otherwise. The long history of non-Indian adoption and
naturalization is mostly forgotten, with the exception of ongoing controversies within the
five Oklahoma tribes concerning the status of Freedmen descendants. 101 As discussed
by Kirsty Gover, tribal constitutions since 1934 have increasingly applied explicit blood
quantum or lineal descent from persons of Indian blood as requirements to define tribal
citizenship. 102 Even the tribal nations that previously naturalized or adopted intermarried
whites and/or Freedmen, except for the Seminoles, have amended their citizenship laws
through various methods to restrict citizenship to those able to document their descent
from persons with Indian blood. 103 Why such changes were made is controversial, and
95

See KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 133 (2010). In her empirical study of tribal constitutions,
Gover states that 92 per cent of constitutions ratified before 1941 contain an express reference to tribal
adoptions. Id. According to Gover, the proportion of constitutions referencing adoptions has since
dropped to 74 per cent, explained as resulting from the omission of adoption provisions in new
constitutions, and not because of amendments to older ones. Id.
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See FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 15 (D. Wilkins, ed. 2006).
97
Id.
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Id. at 14.
99
Constitution of the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, Art. II (May 14, 1936); Constitution of
the Salt River Indian Community, Art. II (June 11, 1940).
100
Id.
101
See infra, notes 103, 104, 105.
102
See Gover, supra, note 96, at 132.
103
The Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek constitutions restrict membership to descendants of individuals
identified on Indian by blood rolls constructed by the Dawes Commission. See Constitution of the
Chickasaw Nation, August 27, 1983, Art. 2, § 1; Constitution of the Choctaw Nation, July 9, 1983, Art. 2, §
1; Constitution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, June 24, 1995, Art. 3, § 2.
The Cherokee Nation amended its constitution in 2007 by referendum approved by the Cherokee
people to require Cherokee, Delaware, or Shawnee Indian blood, thereby intentionally excluding
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beyond the scope of this article. 104 Importantly, the BIA continues to suggest to tribes
that adoption or naturalization should generally not occur, as, according to the Bureau
“inclusion of non-Indians as members” is one of several provisions that “render
proposed constitutions inappropriate.” 105 Gover suggests that such attitude is consistent
with the Bureau’s general view that blood quantum requirements ensure the political
cohesion of a tribal nation. 106 Whatever the reason, there are very few tribes that
explicitly authorize adoption or naturalization of non-Indians as tribal citizens. 107
Some tribes do assert consent through other theories than adoption or
naturalization. Indeed, as shown by the Hjert case discussed above, at least the Port
Gamble S’Klallam tribe has recently attempted to prosecute a non-Indian through
written consent. 108 There may be other tribes that similarly accept consent in individual
or general situations, including as a condition of living or working on tribal lands. Absent
known affirmative statutory law on the practice, is hard to gauge how common such
consent really is within tribal nations.
Cherokee Freedmen and intermarried whites. See Cherokee Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, slip op.
at 4-5 (Cherokee Sup. Ct. August 22, 2011). The Cherokee Supreme Court recently upheld the
referendum by concluding it lacked the jurisdiction to review it. See Id. at 7. Interestingly, as part of its
ruling, the Cherokee Supreme Court stated that the Treaty of 1866 never granted citizenship to the
Freedmen, but only “that the Freedmen would be treated as equals to the citizens of the Cherokee Nation
under the federal law as it existed at the time.” Id. at 8.
The Seminole constitution defines citizenship eligibility as “all Seminole citizens whose names
appear on the final rolls of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma [from 1906] and their descendants,” and
therefore does not exclude Freedmen. Constitution of the Seminoles, March 8, 1969, as amended, Art. 2.
Further, the Seminole membership code indicates that “each Seminole Freedman enrolled member” is
entitled to membership in a Freedman Band of the Nation. Seminole Code, Title 22, § 102(d). However,
the Seminole Nation has barred Freedmen from certain tribal programs through requirements for a
certificate of Indian blood or descendancy from a member of the Seminole Nation as it existed in Florida
th
in 1828, fueling litigation and controversy. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1285-88 (10
Cir. 2003) (describing dispute). The Seminole Nation did attempt to change its membership criteria
through constitutional amendment to eliminate Freedmen citizenship, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs
disapproved the amendment. See Seminole Nation v. Norton, 2001 WL 36228153 at * 17(D.D.C. 2001)
(affirming BIA disapproval of Freedmen amendments).
104
For further discussion of these controversial citizenship issues within the Cherokee and other
Oklahoma tribal nations, see, e.g., CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN THE
CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA 168-200 (2002) (discussing Cherokee Freedmen), KEVIN NOBLE
MAILLARD, REDWASHING HISTORY: TRIBAL ANACHRONISMS IN THE SEMINOLE NATION CASES, IN THE INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 87 (2012) (discussing Freedmen controversy in Seminole Nation).
105
United States Department of the Interior, Developing and Reviewing Tribal Constitutions and
Amendments: A Handbook 6-7 (1987), quoted in Gover, supra, note 96, at 119.
106
Gover, supra, note 96, at 127-28.
107
The Seminole Nation of Oklahoma’s constitution allows enrollment of Freedmen descendants and
assignment to a Freedman Band of the Nation. See supra, note 103. However, such Freedmen may
indeed have Indian ancestry, though the Dawes Commission may not have documented it when it went
about classifying Indians by blood and Freedmen for the Seminole rolls. See Maillard, supra, note 105, at
97-98; Ariela Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell 155-160 (2008) (discussing subjective decisions of Dawes
Commission in classifying individuals as Indians by blood or Freedmen for preparation of Dawes Rolls).
Interestingly, Congress authorized only one Seminole roll, but the Dawes Commission itself separated out
the rolls between Seminoles by blood and Freedmen. Gross, supra, at 153.
108
See text accompanying notes 7-13.
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The Navajo Nation has affirmatively asserted a theory of consent for a certain
class of non-Indians. The Navajo Nation Council amended its criminal code in 2000 to
assert full criminal jurisdiction over all persons married to Navajos, called hadane in the
Navajo language. 109 At the same time, the Nation purported to be able to “civilly
prosecute” other non-Indians. 110 Apparently based on the Navajo Supreme Court
opinion Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, 111 the Council in 2000
stated that
[n]othing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over one by reason of assuming tribal relations with the Navajo
people or being an “in law” or hadane or relative as defined by Navajo
Common law, custom or tradition, submits himself or herself to the
criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. 112
In Means, the Court applied Navajo common law to conclude that such “in-laws”
consent to Navajo jurisdiction through the reciprocal obligations they owe the clan of
their Navajo spouse. 113 Interestingly, the Court justified such theory of consent through
citations to Nofire and the other U.S. Supreme Court opinions discussed above, even
though those opinions affirmed non-Indian consent recognized by the United States
through treaty and statute. 114 Though Means concerned a non-member Indian, the
Council extended the theory of consent to non-Indian spouses. Importantly, the Navajo
Nation Code prohibits adoption of non-Navajos, and does not otherwise recognize the
naturalization of non-Indian hadane as citizens of the Nation. 115 The Nation applies a
one-quarter blood quantum requirement to be recognized as a Navajo citizen. 116 The
only explicit benefit for in-laws under the Navajo Code is that they receive second-tier
employment preference below enrolled Navajos, but above other Indians not married to
Navajos, under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act. 117
However, though the Navajo Criminal Code purports to extend the Nation’s
criminal jurisdiction to non-Indians, in reality the Navajo Division of Public Safety, the
109

See 17 N.N.C. § 204(C) (2005).
17 N.N.C. § 204(A) (2005).
111
7 Nav. R. 382 (1999).
112
17 N.N.C. § 204(C) (2005).
113
Means, 7 Nav. R 392-93. For a detailed discussion of the Means case, which concerned American
Indian Movement activist Russell Means and his challenge to Navajo criminal jurisdiction, see Paul
Spruhan, Case Note: Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District and the Hadane Doctrine in
Navajo Criminal Law, 1 TRIBAL L. J. 3 (2000-2001).
114
Means, 7 Nav. R. at 391-92.
115
See 1 N.N.C. § 702(A) (2005). Interestingly, this provision was intended to prevent non-Indian actors
from claiming to have been adopted or made honorary members of the Nation while filming movies in the
area during the 1930s. See Paul Spruhan, The Origins, Current Status, and Future Prospects of Blood
Quantum as the Definition of Citizenship in the Navajo Nation, 8 TRIBAL L. J. 1, 4 (2008).
116
1 N.N.C. § 701(C) (2005). For a discussion of this provision and its origins, see Spruhan, supra, note
115, at 3-10.
117
See 15 N.N.C. § 614(A) (2005).
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Office of the Prosecutor, and the Navajo Nation courts have not invoked such authority
in an actual situation at the time of the writing of this article. Part of the reason for this is
that the Nation’s police officers are cross-commissioned or otherwise authorized to
enforce Arizona and New Mexico state law. 118 They therefore can arrest non-Indians
without having to invoke Navajo law and can transfer them to state authorities if
consistent with the Nation’s extradition laws. 119 Further, many of the Nation’s officers
and criminal investigators have Special Law Enforcement Commissions from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 120 Such commissions allow the Nation’s officer and criminal
investigators to make federal arrests, including of non-Indians, and transfer such
offenders to federal custody for crimes under federal jurisdiction. 121 Therefore, as a
practical matter, the Nation’s law enforcement need not invoke Navajo law to arrest and
seek prosecution of non-Indians, though Navajo law allows it. Whether declination of
prosecution by the state or federal governments will trigger the desire to test its stated
authority over non-Indian hadane remains to be seen.
A REVIEW OF POSSIBLE THEORIES OF CONSENT
What ways might tribal nations think about asserting jurisdiction through
consent? There are three examples discussed above: (1) recognizing citizenship in the
nation through formal or informal adoption or naturalization, (2) imputing consent under
tribal law by marrying a tribal citizen or otherwise becoming part of an Indian family or
tribal society, and (3) accepting an invocation of consent in writing. Each of these three
examples involves either complex questions of tribal law and policy.
All involve complex questions of tribal law and policy. Granting citizenship to nonIndians is the most controversial. Tribal citizenship for a given tribal nation may be so
inherently a matter of family, clan, or “blood” that a tribe will not admit anyone not
biologically descended from a tribal member or at least from a person with Indian
ancestry. A tribe’s traditional law may preclude it, or the prevailing policy views of the
tribe and its citizens may be against granting citizenship to non-Indians. However, tribal
nations might seriously consider it, if not inconsistent with its own views of its identity
and such identity’s relationship to political citizenship in the tribe. 122
118

See, e.g., A.R.S. 13-3874(A) (empowering tribal police to enforce Arizona laws if APOST certified);
Cross-Commission Agreement between the Navajo Nation and the McKinley County Sheriff’s Office
(December 8, 2007) (authorizing Navajo police to act as county sheriffs in McKinley County, New
Mexico).
119
See 17 N.N.C. §§ 1951, et seq. (2005) (setting out requirements for extradition of Indians by state
authorities). While restricted in the statute to Indians, it may be that a Navajo Nation court would require
an extradition request from a state government even for a non-Indian in Navajo custody, particularly one
married to a Navajo.
120
See 25 U.S.C. 2804(a) (authorizing tribal and other non-federal law enforcement to be commissioned
as federal officers by the Bureau of Indian Affairs); 12 C.F.R. § 12.21(a) (discussing SLECs).
121
See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (authorizing federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against
Indians).
122
For discussions supporting consideration of such a proposal, see Matthew Fletcher, Race and Indian
Tribal Nationhood, 11 W YO. L. REV. 295, 324 (2011); John Snowden, et al., American Indian Sovereignty
and Naturalization: It’s a Race Thing, 80 NEBR. L. REV. 171, 237-38 (2001).
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It would appear that granting full citizenship, with the right to vote and otherwise
politically and socially participate in tribal government, has the best chance of justifying
tribal criminal jurisdiction through consent under federal law. Indeed, the reasoning of
the recent United States Supreme Court opinions limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction,
particularly in Duro v. Reina, suggests as much. In Duro, Justice Kennedy tied the
inherent authority of tribal nations to Anglo-American theories of consent by the
governed. 123 Kennedy concluded that a tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction even over
citizens of other tribes, so-called “non-member Indians,” because they were not citizens
of the prosecuting tribe and therefore can never “consent” to tribal government. 124
Kennedy rejected the argument that a defendant’s contacts with the tribe or a tribal
member justified the tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction, stating that such an argument was
just another attempt at establishing jurisdiction through mere physical presence on tribal
lands. 125 Importantly, Kennedy explicitly reserved the question whether a nonmember
could consent to tribal jurisdiction through some other method. 126
In Justice Kennedy’s formulation, the definition of tribal citizenship through
familial or biological ties is the key stumbling block for tribal jurisdiction. The use of tribal
or Indian blood quantum by definition bars naturalization of anyone not already in
possession of the necessary ancestry. Fixing that is as easy as changing the citizenship
criteria of the tribal nation. It is important, however, to add the caveat that the
Department of the Interior might assert itself directly through disapproval of any
necessary tribal constitutional changes to citizenship rules or by generally opining that
such change is impermissible. 127 Whether something as seemingly radical, at least from
a modern perception of Indian identity, as citizenship for non-Indians is a plausible
political and social possibility in any tribal nation is another question. 128
The Navajo Nation approach has the attractive quality of being based on tribal
traditional law, but has the weakness of imputing consent by conduct. The Nation does
not seek any affirmative acceptance of the responsibility of an in-law to Navajo law, but
simply states that marriage to a Navajo subjects the non-Indian spouse to its
jurisdiction. Marriage to a Navajo is indeed more than simple conduct, as it creates a
legal relationship between the spouses. However, the Nation’s assertion of jurisdiction
does not depend on creating a legal relationship under the laws of the Navajo Nation or
on explicit consent to Navajo law as part of the marriage ceremony, as apparently
anyone married to a Navajo under any state or tribal law subjects himself or herself to
123

See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94.
Id.
125
Id. at 695.
126
Id. at 698 (“We have no occasion in this case to address the effect of a formal acquiescence to tribal
jurisdiction that might be made, for example, in return for a tribe's agreement not to exercise its power to
exclude an offender from tribal lands[.]”)
127
See supra, text accompanying notes 93-94, 106, 105.
128
See, e.g., Fletcher, supra, note 123, at 324-25 (discussing “zealous” defense of citizenship criteria by
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians as example of potential resistance by tribes to
expanding citizenship rules).
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Navajo jurisdiction through the marriage itself. With no corollary right to vote or directly
participate in the government of the Nation, such theory does not appear to alleviate the
concerns expressed by Justice Kennedy. 129 Whether the Nation or any other tribe
should be concerned about conforming their views on jurisdiction to external
expectations, particularly when supported by and consistent with tribal traditional law, is
another question.
The Port Gamble S’Klallam approach, if authorized by the tribal nation’s own law,
and if done carefully, has its strengths. Here, there is no imputation of consent; consent
is clearly given. The use of a form clearly stating the non-Indian’s right to consent or not,
and an explanation of the conditions under which the tribe will accept the consent, goes
a long way in bolstering the perception that tribal nations adhere to notions of fairness
familiar to outside federal courts. It may be that the Port Gamble S’Klallam Court of
Appeals’ emphasis on a clear and intelligently given consent reflects the tribal justices’
expectations that non-Indians be given full due process rights as a matter of tribal
concepts of fairness and justice. Regardless, such emphasis clearly assuages their
stated concerns over compliance with the federal Indian Civil Rights Act and federal
notions of due process and equal protection. 130 Such requirements may then fulfill tribal
law and, whether consciously or not, conform to federal requirements as well.
That approach appears stronger than generally purporting to subject a nonIndian to criminal jurisdiction as a condition of residence on tribal lands or employment
by the tribe or one of its members. 131 However, the explicit conditioning of residency on
tribal lands or employment by a tribe or its enterprises at least involves some benefit in
exchange for the consent, unlike the bare consent in Hjert, 132 though not the right to
political participation contemplated in Duro. 133 Indeed, as a tribe has the power to
exclude non-members from tribal lands, 134 why can’t a tribe condition the privilege of
living on such lands through consent to all tribal laws? Indeed, even under stringent
United States Supreme Court case law such consent at the very least can establish
some civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 135 However, the Court also has stated that the
assertion of tribal civil jurisdiction must have a nexus to the non-Indian’s consent, and
consent in one area does not result in general consent to all tribal jurisdiction. 136 If such
blanket consent is questionable in the civil context, it is even less likely allowable in the
criminal context. However, as a practical matter, if the non-Indian breaches the
agreement by filing a federal petition for habeas corpus to preclude prosecution, the
129

For a further discussion of this problem of imputed consent under the hadane theory, see Spruhan,
supra, note 114.
130
See Hjert. No. POR-CR-09/209-169, slip op. at 16.
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See Id. Applying an immigration analogy, Professor Fletcher supports a requirement that non-members
consent to full tribal jurisdiction as a condition of living in tribal housing or on tribal lands. See Fletcher,
supra, note 122, at 326.
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No. POR-CR-09/209-169.
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495 U.S. 676.
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See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982).
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See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
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Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).
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tribe can simply exclude him or her or terminate their employment, assuming such
action is otherwise consistent with tribal law. For non-Indians with tribal member
spouses and children, such consequences can be a compelling incentive for
compliance. However, it is unclear whether any tribe actually enforces such consent, 137
and such theory is therefore untested.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the great divide between tribes and the United States Supreme Court
reflects quite different theories of consent. For the tribes discussed in this article,
consent by non-Indians is almost exclusively based on conduct less than full political
participation and citizenship. From mere physical presence to marriage to case-specific
consent, tribes have conceptualized consent under their own laws and policies, and
have not extended full political rights to non-Indians as a condition of the assumption of
criminal authority. Whether tribes adjust their views to comply with the Court’s vision of
consent by the governed, seemingly requiring full political participation, or transcend
that vision to conform to their own unique views of government authority, is within the
right of each tribe to decide. However, the consequences of those choices on tribal
societies must be fully acknowledged and understood, as any attempt to assert criminal
jurisdiction ultimately can subject the tribe to federal court review.
Regardless of the relative merits of these different theories of consent, there is a
simpler way for a tribe to exercise its full sovereignty: a non-Indian can simply consent
by not objecting to such jurisdiction. Barring sua sponte action by the tribal court, as
happened in Hjert, 138 the non-Indian defendant has all the power to consent he or she
needs. He or she can simply decline to seek dismissal of the case on jurisdictional
grounds or seek habeas review in federal court. Indeed, if non-Indians living and
working within tribal nations truly believe the rhetoric of tribal sovereignty, they should
practice it through consent. It may be difficult for anyone subjected involuntarily to a
criminal justice system to forego an argument that could bar prosecution. However, for
non-Indians caught up in day-to-day incidents within Indian Country, it is time to
consider something larger: the continued vitality of tribal governments through the
practical application of tribal sovereignty. For non-Indians married into the tribe, or who
are employed by the tribal government or one of its members, or have permission to
reside on tribal lands, compliance is a natural outgrowth of the privileges received. This
also means, however, that a tribal government may have to adjust its views on who their
constituents are, and to whom tribal services are provided.

137

The Pueblo of Isleta recently began requiring non-members, apparently not just non-Indians, to pass a
background check before being allowed to reside within the Pueblo. See Ungelbah Daniel-Davila, NonTribal Residents of Isleta Pueblo Must Undergo Background Checks, Albuquerque Journal, February 29,
2012, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/02/29/abqnewsseeker/non-tribal-residents-of-isleta-pueblomust-undergo-background-checks.html. Though there is no apparent requirement to consent to tribal
criminal laws, the Pueblo ordinance is one method of conditioning residency on adherence to tribal
requirements.
138
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Put another way, non-Indian obedience to tribal law is active resistance to the
ongoing federal reduction of tribal authority. Ultimately, even if the U.S. Supreme Court
denies a tribal nation’s power to condition citizenship, residence, or employment by
consent to criminal jurisdiction, a non-Indian still can empower tribal nations through on
the ground compliance with tribal law. That can never be taken away.
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